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Teaching Negotiation Ethics
Art Hinshaw

I. Introduction
Practicing lawyers are involved in a variety of negotiations on a regular basis,
and as a result, are expected to have mastered the art and skill of negotiating.
Furthermore, they are rightfully expected to understand the ethical issues and
rules surrounding the negotiation process. Recent studies, however, show that
a significant number of practicing lawyers are unable to apply the negotiation
ethics requirements—refraining from making fraudulent misrepresentations—
when other competing legal values are in the mix. In one study nearly onethird of the attorney respondents indicated that they would agree to engage
in a fraudulent settlement scheme if a client asked them to do so.1 Two other
studies showed that approximately one-quarter of attorney respondents were
unable to correctly identify the proper ethical response in four run-of-the-mill
negotiation situations.2
When such a basic lawyering activity results in such a large percentage of
practicing attorneys violating the ethical rules, there’s a problem. Moreover,
when the violated behavioral standard is so low, the problem truly is serious
and needs to be addressed on many fronts. One such front is the teaching of
negotiation ethics in law schools.
The teaching of negotiation ethics, however, is not necessarily a happy
endeavor. Many who teach it leave the topic feeling unsettled because students
find the take home lesson to be that deceit, misdirection, dissembling, and
lying are “ethical.” Disturbingly Orwellian as that sounds, it is true in many
instances. However, if we simply focus on the bare essentials without putting
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negotiations in a broader context of interpersonal interactions and procedural
justice, we set our students up for hard lessons once they are in practice. This
article presents several methods of helping professors teach negotiation ethics
with greater depth and sensitivity, focusing on approaches that are more likely
to resonate with students and instructors—even those instructors who have
difficulty understanding what it is about routine bargaining that some find so
troubling. No matter which method is chosen to teach the topic, our primary
goal as instructors should be for students to learn the skills of identifying and
resolving negotiation ethics problems in context.3
This article unfolds as follows. Part II focuses on the black letter law that
instructors should be teaching their students—the law of fraud and Rule 4.1
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct4 and its state counterparts. The
emphasis on black letter law here should help instructors impart the standards’
respective simplicity. But this simplicity leads to a problem: the disconnect
between the black letter law we are teaching and the lessons the students
actually learn. Part III describes this problem, one that conflates ethical and
legal behavior with negotiation tactics, which may encourage students to
push closer to the edge of the ethical standard, or even over it, when they
otherwise would not. Part IV provides several methods of breathing life into
the negotiation ethics standards thereby making them tangible. Not only
will these tools help students internalize the ethical standard, but they help
the students appreciate that there is more to the ethics equation than simply
the standards themselves. The article concludes with a simple proposition—
returning the profession’s ethical sensibilities in the negotiation realm starts
in the classroom. Why the classroom? Because it’s the only place where
communal norms can be openly discussed and students can make mistakes
as they try to get a feel for the norms without too much of a penalty if they
overreach.
II. The Black Letter Law of Negotiation Ethics
There are many aspects of the law that have an impact on negotiations. For
instance, under the Model Rules lawyers have a duty to consult with their
clients regarding the objectives of their representation and the means to be
employed (Rule 1.2(a)), which dramatically affects lawyers’ negotiation duties
since a client’s objectives may change during the course of a negotiation.5
Another example is when negotiations occur in a litigation setting. In
that environment, issues of candor to a tribunal come into play (Rule 3.3),
particularly in judicial settlement conferences.6 Furthermore, Rule 8.4 defines
3.

See Bruce A. Green, Less Is More: Teaching Ethics in Context, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 357,
359 (1998) [hereinafter Less is More]; Bruce A. Green, Teaching Lawyers Ethics, 51 St. Louis
U. L.J. 1091, 1099–1100 (2007) [hereinafter Teaching Lawyers].

4.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 (2009).

5.

Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities and Liabilities in
Negotiations, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 249, 260 (2009).

6.

See, e.g., In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975 (Ariz. 1995).
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professional misconduct as engaging “in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.”7 While these principles are important, this
section’s focus is on the primary legal rules governing attorney negotiation
ethics, the law of fraud and Rule 4.1.
A. The Law of Fraud
All bargaining interactions are governed by the law of fraud, which appears
as both part of the law of contracts and of torts. For the most part the rules
for claims in these two areas are the same. The primary differences are (a)
the requirement that a representation need not be material in order to void a
contract, and (b) the available remedies.8 One can receive damages in a tort
claim whereas a contract may not have been formed in the first place or it may
simply be voidable.9
To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show
that there was a knowing misrepresentation of a material fact upon which the
plaintiff reasonably relied causing an injury or damages.10 A misrepresentation
is “knowing” if the maker (a) knows or believes the matter is not as she represents
it to be, (b) does not have confidence in the accuracy of the representation, or
(c) knows that there is no basis for the representation.11 A misrepresentation is
material if it would influence a reasonable person’s actions in the transaction
in question,12 but certain statements are not considered to be material. For
example, statements as to quality, value, or price are considered matters where
opinions may be expected to differ, although they may be material statements
in limited circumstances.13
Typically a party to a transaction is not liable for harm caused by failing to
disclose information of which the other party is ignorant. However, the other
may be able to rescind the transaction if the information is basic (i.e., goes
to the basis or essence of the transaction) and may be entitled to restitution
for any monies paid.14 Furthermore, an omission may be equivalent to an
7.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(c) (2009).

8.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 161, 425 (1981); Michael L. Moffit & Andrea Kupfer
Schneider, Dispute Resolution: Examples and Explanations 29 (Aspen Pub. 2008).

9.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 163, 164; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977).
The remainder of this section will be based primarily on the tort action of fraud.

10.

See, e.g., Renaissance Leasing, LLC v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 131 (Mo. 2010);
Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 , 712 (Ohio 1987); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 525.

11.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526.

12.

Motorola, Inc. v. Amkor Technology, Inc., 849 A.2d 931, 937 (Del. 2004); Defendant A v.
Idaho State Bar, 2 P.3d 147, 152 (Idaho 2000); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538.

13.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538A cmts. b, g.

14.

Shwartz v. Morgan, 776 N.W.2d 827, 831 (S.D. 2009); Pearson v. Simmonds Precision
Products, Inc., 624 A.2d 1134, 1136 (Vt. 1993); Restatement of Restitution §§ 8, 28 (Tentative
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affirmative statement when one is under a duty to disclose that fact.15 Such
a duty arises when there is a fiduciary relationship or other relationship of
trust and when disclosure would either correct a prior misstatement that was
believed to be true when made or would be necessary to prevent a partial
or ambiguous statement from being misleading.16 Other situations where the
duty arises include making a false representation with no expectation that it
will be relied upon and subsequently learning that the other is relying on that
statement and knowingly entering into a transaction with another who has a
mistaken understanding about basic information.17 The final situation where a
duty to disclose prevails is because of the parties’ relationship, trade customs
or some other objective circumstances.18
B. Rule 4.1
Outside of the law of bargaining to which all negotiators are subject,
attorneys are also subject to the dictates of Rule 4.1 which states:
4.1: Truthfulness in Statements to Others
In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

The Rule’s operative term is the word “material,” which means the fact or law
in question must reasonably be viewed as important, significant, or essential to
the terms of the finalized deal.19 However, Comment Two specifically narrows
what constitutes a material fact by stating that estimates of price or value and
a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim “ordinarily are not
taken as statements of material fact.”20 The use of the word ordinarily indicates
Draft No. 1, 2001); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 164, 303(b); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 551 cmts. a, b.
15.

Bossuyt v. Osage Farmers Nat’l Bank, 360 N.W.2d 769, 774 (Iowa 1985); Kessel v. Leavitt,
511 S.E.2d 720, 753 (W. Va. 1998); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161; Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 551.

16.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coughlin, 255 S.W.3d 424, 428–30 (Ark. 2007); Wright v. Brooke
Grp. Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 174–75 (Iowa 2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(a),
(d); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2).

17.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(b); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(d).

18.

NOLM, LLC v. County of Clark, 100 P.3d 658, 661–62 (Nev. 2004); Ollerman v. O’Rourke
Co., Inc., 288 N.W.2d 95, 99–100 (Wis. 1980); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(b);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (e).

19.

See Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 449 (D. Md. 2002) (defining
material fact); Black’s Law Dictionary 998 (8th ed. 2004); Richmond, supra note 5, at 269.
See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162(b); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538.

20.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 cmt. 2.
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there are times when these kinds of statements can be material facts.21 In fact,
the ABA Ethics Committee has concluded that both a lawyer’s settlement
authority and a client’s actual bottom-line can be material to a negotiation.22
For example, even though a client’s board of directors has authorized a
higher settlement figure, a lawyer may state in a negotiation that the client does
not wish to settle for more than $50. However, it would not be permissible for
the lawyer to state that the board of directors had formally disapproved any
settlement in excess of $50, when authority had in fact been granted to settle
for a larger sum.23
Thus under Rule 4.1, the more specific a declaration is about one’s settlement
authority, the more likely it is for another attorney to reasonably rely on that
statement.24
Rule 4.1 not only addresses affirmative statements, but it also addresses
omissions. Generally, lawyers have no duty voluntarily to inform an
opposing party of relevant facts when negotiating;25 however, the rule creates
a duty to disclose material information only if doing so avoids assisting in
a client’s criminal conduct or fraud.26 The second sentence in Rule 4.1(b)
makes it appear that Rule 1.6, the rule requiring attorneys to maintain client
confidences, supersedes this section. When read in conjunction with (a) Rule
1.2(a) which prohibits attorneys from knowingly participating in a client’s
criminal or fraudulent conduct, (b) the exceptions to Rule 1.6 which permit
disclosure with respect to criminal or fraudulent conduct, and (c) the “shall
not knowingly . . . fail to disclose” language in Rule 4.1(b), it is clear that the
clause invoking Rule 1.6 is superfluous.27
Rule 4.1(a) simply requires lawyers to speak the truth as they understand
it without engaging in any misrepresentations of material issues.28 However, a
21.

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538A cmt. g (describing when price is a material fact).

22.

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370 (1993); ABA Comm. on
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). Specifically the committee has
stated:
[C]are must be taken by the lawyer to ensure that communications regarding the
client’s position, which otherwise would not be considered statements “of fact,” are
not conveyed in language that converts them, even inadvertently, into false factual
representations.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006). Although
Opinion 93-370 discusses negotiations in a judicial settlement proceeding, Opinion 06-493
applies its conclusions about material facts to bilateral negotiations and mediation settings.

23.

ABA Formal Op. 06-439.

24.

Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 1, at 152-53.

25.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.4.1, cmt 1.

26.

Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1(b).

27.

Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 1, at 105, 155-56.

28.

See id. at 104. For example, incorporating or adopting a statement by another that the lawyer
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lawyer is not prohibited from making deliberate misrepresentations about nonmaterial facts or law to anyone.29 Rule 4.1 (b) prohibits knowing omissions
that assist clients in criminal or fraudulent conduct. Thus, the scope of Rule
4.1 generally parallels the law of fraud, except that there is no requirement for
reliance or damages for the bar’s regulatory authorities to institute disciplinary
action.30
III. What Students Learn
Law school is a highly competitive individualistic endeavor. The
competition begins during the application process and continues through
the grading process, which acts as the gatekeeper to the law school rewards
system including employment.31 As the Carnegie Report recently stated, “the
intensely competitive atmosphere militates against a cooperative learning
environment.”32 Negotiation courses are simply another forum appealing to
students’ competitiveness. Within every negotiation there is a distribution of
goods, money or other items of value where negotiators must decide how to
maximize their gains. The distributive portion of negotiation causes many
people, including a good number of our students, to see competition as the
essence of negotiation.
It is in this competitive environment where we teach students negotiation
ethics, and we do so as we do for most topics taught in the legal academy—we
focus on the operative rule and then on the exceptions to the rule. Noting that
this standard simply requires lawyers to refrain from engaging in fraudulent
misrepresentations, the lowest level of legally acceptable conduct, we have
essentially told students that anything they do short of fraud is “ethical.”33
Professors whose goal is to imbue in their students professional norms higher
than the floor of acceptable conduct typically attempt to rehabilitate that goal
by cautioning students that:
knows to be untrue is a violation of Rule 4.1(a). Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 cmt.
1 (2007).
29.

Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering 37-6 (Aspen Pub., 3d ed.
2004).

30.

Russell Korobkin, Michael Moffitt & Nancy Welsch, The Law of Bargaining, 87 Marq. L.
Rev. 839, 844 (2004).

31.

Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment in Law
School, 52 J. Legal Educ. 75, 78, 81–82 (2002).

32.

William M. Sullivan, Ann Colby, Judith W. Wegner, Lloyd Bond & Lee S. Shulman,
Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 166 (Jossey-Bass 2007).

33.

This oddity has led some to argue that the Model Rules’ approach to negotiation ethics reflects
little or no coherent ethical system. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality, and
Professional Responsibility in Negotiation, in Dispute Resolution Ethics: A Comprehensive
Guide 119, 132 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., ABA 2002) (bemoaning “how
indeterminate and unhelpful the formal rules of professional responsibility are”); Barry R.
Tempkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negotiations: Should There Be a
Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 Geo J. Legal Ethics 179, 180 (2004).

88

Journal of Legal Education

• The rules are a floor, not a ceiling;
• The exceptions don’t include everything;
• You don’t always want to take advantage of the exceptions; and
• There are ways that lying—even if it’s okay under the rule—will hurt
your credibility, reputation, and future negotiations.34
But because students pay little attention to sanctimonious lectures about
ethics,35 it’s easy for the black letter law to seduce them into hearing something
very different:
• The exception swallows the rule;
• The rule requires misrepresentation about all non-material facts;
• Everyone lies in negotiation; and
• You can lie about anything—even material facts—as long as you don’t
get caught.36
Certainly not every student is cynical enough to come away with these
lessons, but for those who do, teaching them negotiation ethics may do more
harm than good.37 This is what causes many instructors to feel uneasy.
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff suggests a method for responding to this
misinterpretation—by adopting a defensive driving approach. In essence, she
suggests that negotiators follow the rules of the road, but keep a watchful
eye on others for transgressions in order to be ready to respond quickly.38 For
example, one can work on recognizing and thwarting evasive tactics, watching
for signs of deception, and using “come clean” questions strategically.39
Furthermore, she suggests giving students affirmative reasons to behave
ethically beyond the minimal requirements of the rules.40 Instead of treating
negotiation ethics as an esoteric philosophical topic of class discussion, make
them tangible and real. Tie rewards, recognition, and punishment to ethical
behavior. Show them the tangible benefits of negotiating ethically beyond the
minimal requirements of the rules, as well as the consequences of negotiating
unethically or minimally ethically.
34.

Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, AALS Presentation, The Challenges of Teaching Negotiation
Ethics: Rules and Reality (Jan. 8, 2010).

35.

Charles B. Craver, AALS Presentation, Overcoming the Difficulties of Teaching Negotiation
Ethics (Jan. 8, 2010).

36.

Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 34.

37.

Furthermore, our teachings can lead us to believe that either the negotiation ethics rules fail
to reflect reality or that our aspiriations for honesty in negotiations are unattainable. See e.g.,
Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1219, n.33 (1990)
(quoting R. Haydock); Eleanor Holmes Norten, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 493, 506 (1989),

38.

Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 34.

39.

See Reilly, supra note 2, at 530-33.

40.

Id.
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IV. Making Negotiation Ethics Real
Without connecting ethical interactions to real world issues, students will
simply lull themselves into a false sense of security.41 They believe that they
will negotiate ethically, that they will be able to recognize ethical issues and
problems when they appear, and that they will be able to act ethically in the
moment. To dispel this naiveté and make negotiation ethics lessons stick, the
class should be a reflection of the real world where penalties exist for unethical
behavior.42 Only by reflecting the real world will students come to appreciate
the importance of reputation and trust in negotiation.
A. Simulation Exercises
The most basic method of making the standards come alive is using
simulation exercises geared towards teaching the standard. The benefits of
simulation learning in law schools has long been known—the simulations
provide useful models of situations that might confront a practicing lawyer, but
they also provide a controlled classroom environment where there is relatively
little at risk for the student and the public.43 Furthermore, simulations integrate
theory and practice while having positive effects on student motivation and
attitudes towards learning.44 This is likely because law students, like all adult
learners, learn best through experience followed by feedback and discussion of
the experience with subsequent correction.45 As a result, simulation exercises
provide the opportunity to appeal to student learning preferences while
demonstrating the ethical demands of negotiation practice.
Negotiation courses, like many skill courses, routinely have been taught
using simulations for these very reasons46 and are often quite popular with
students. On the other hand, professional responsibility courses, where
the majority of students are exposed to the topic of negotiation ethics, are
commonly regarded as dull and unnecessary. Student resentment of these
courses is legendary, spawning a number of suggestions for making the classes
41.

Craver, supra note 35.

42.

Id.

43.

See, e.g., Roy Stuckey and Others, Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a
Roadmap 170 (CLEA 2007); Jay M. Feinman, Simulations, An Introduction, 45 J. Legal
Educ. 469 (1995); Gerald R. Williams, Using Simulation Exercises for Negotiation and
Other Dispute Resolution Courses, 34 J. Legal Educ. 307 (1984).

44.

Stuckey, supra note 43, at 167.

45.

Malcolm S. Knowles, Elwood F. Holton III & Richard A. Swanson, The Adult Learner
40 (Butterworth-Heinemann, 6th ed. 2005); Green, Less Is More, supra note 3, at 359;
see also Stuckey, supra note 43, at 149–57 (recommending that law professors give students
opportunities to engage in problem solving activities in order to cultivate “practical
wisdom”).

46.

See, e.g., Williams, supra note 43, at 307 (discussing this practice in 1984).
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more engaging.47 Using simulation exercises is frequently suggested as one
method of addressing this problem.48
As with any lesson plan, instructors should have specific goals when using
simulation exercises. With respect to negotiation ethics, research has found
that practicing lawyers are particularly weak in three areas: applying Rule
4.1 when it is in tension with competing legal rules and values, identifying
what constitutes a material fact under Rule 4.1, and understanding the law of
misrepresentation.49 In negotiation courses, particular ethical issues, such as
what constitutes a material fact, can be incorporated into the debrief portion
of any or every negotiation simulation. In professional responsibility courses,
where there is typically time for only one negotiation simulation, instructors
should use one scenario that is particularly good for all of these lessons—the
DONS Negotiation developed at the Harvard Program on Negotiation.50
In the DONS Negotiation, the claim at issue is based on the transmission
of a deadly hypothetical sexually transmitted disease for which there is no
cure. The students play the roles of attorneys and clients in the settlement
of the claim, which has yet to be filed, and they are instructed that attorneys
will meet with their clients to complete their negotiation preparation. The
negotiation looks like a straight forward discussion about the amount of
damages to settle the claim, but both clients have information which they ask
their respective attorneys not to disclose in the negotiation. For the putative
defendant, the critical information is the fact that she will be receiving a
substantial inheritance, which means she would be able to pay substantially
more money to resolve the claim in the near future. For the claimant, it turns
out that his positive tests for the disease were false positives. He does not have
the disease after all but wants to punish his former girlfriend for causing him
to think he was going to die.51
What makes this exercise so good is that it puts the Rule 4.1 standard
in focus, bringing to life the tension between Rule 4.1 and other important
legal values—client confidentiality, client centered representation, and zealous
advocacy. While the presenting ethical questions embedded in this problem are
straight forward—the claimant’s attorney cannot agree to her client’s request
to refrain from disclosing the fact that he does not have the disease and the
47.

See, e.g., Green, Less Is More, supra note 3, at 377–91; Deborah L. Rhode, Teaching Legal
Ethics, 51 St. Louis U L.J. 1043, 1047–48, 1052–55 (2007).

48.

See, e.g., David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 31, 59 (1995); James P. Moliterno, Legal Education,
Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 71, 107–17
(1996).

49.

Hinshaw & Alberts, supra note 1, at 148-49.

50.

The DONS Negotiation is written by Robert C. Bordone and Jonathan Cohen based on
another simulation by Nevan Elam and Whitney Fox from the Program on Negotiation
Clearinghouse, available at http://www.pon.org or 800-258-4406.

51.

In response to his positive DONS test the claimant quit his job, gave away his worldly
possessions, and started going to counseling.
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would-be-defendant’s information can remain confidential for now52—students
on both sides of the negotiation routinely make errors applying the ethical
standard.53 These results naturally lead to interesting and sometimes heated
class discussions as students attempt to defend their respective deceptions and
others complain about being deceived, thereby creating the raw material to
bring Rule 4.1 to life. There are other good simulation exercises that illustrate
issues relating to deceit in negotiation, but I am not aware of one where Rule
4.1 is thrust to the forefront as in the DONS Negotiation.54
B. Ethics Trials and Open Class Discussions
One method of imparting the importance of negotiation ethics, which is
more suited to negotiation courses than professional responsibility courses,
is to have the ethical standards enforced throughout the class. To do this, the
ethics rules can be enforced as they are in practice—through official complaints
to an ethics arbiter who decides whether the rules have been violated. This is
precisely what Charles Craver does in his negotiation course.55
Craver creates a course rule, in force from day one, that mimics Rule 4.1 and
its comments.56 To bring forward a rule violation claim, a student must file a
formal charge by the end of the week so that Craver can prepare his next class
to include the trial. The trial proceeds much as any reader of this article would
anticipate. Craver presides as the judge and the non-involved class members
comprise the jury.57 The accusing party presents evidence and witnesses who are
subject to cross examination; the accused party has the opportunity to present
52.

The putative defendant’s attorney has to be careful when answering questions about her
client’s assets, as a false response may violate Rule 4.1.

53.

Practicing lawyers made similar mistakes when given this hypothetical. See Hinshaw &
Alberts, supra note 1.

54.

Mossyback Lane, written by Professor Russell Korobkin, falls into this category as Rule 4.1
may explicitly come into play during the negotiation or it might not. Prisoners’ dilemma
games, group negotiation exercises where negotiators are tempted by vast rewards for
deceiving fellow negotiators, are good introductions for a number of negotiation issues
including ethics. Such games are best used in this introductory capacity, as a large number
of negotiation instructors currently do.

55.

Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics for Real World Interactions, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 299, 308 (2010).

56.

The rule in its entirety states:
You may not make any intentional misrepresentation of any material law or fact during
your negotiations. However, representations concerning one side’s value system
or what one is willing to accept shall not be considered representations concerning
“material” information. Statements that one side could do better by not settling are
to be considered statements regarding client settlement intentions (i.e., permissible
“puffing”).
Charles B. Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement, Revised Teacher’s Manual
14 (Lexis, 6th ed. 2010).

57.

Id.
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rebuttal evidence and witnesses who are also subject to cross examination.58
Once the evidence has been presented, both parties have the opportunity to
make closing arguments, and the jury votes by secret ballot on each charged
violation.59 In his class a super-majority of three-fourths is required to support
any finding of improper conduct. If found guilty of unethical conduct, that
student’s grade suffers dramatically.60 This method may be too draconian for
some, as evidenced by the fact that Craver has never received a request for
an ethics trial in his years of teaching.61 Rather than creating a high stakes
system of raising ethics issues, another way to make the same points is to
encourage students who believe there has been an ethics infraction to raise the
issue in class for discussion. Instead of the potential for public punishment,
the accusations can serve as teaching points illustrating appropriate and
inappropriate negotiation conduct. This open discussion method is typically
how Craver handles these issues in his class.62
Whether the conduct in question results in trial or open discussion, the
resulting conversation is likely to flag the accused as someone who may not be
trustworthy in subsequent negotiations. This is the overarching lesson of this
pedagogical method—one’s actions when negotiating result in reputational
consequences. That said, students already have reputations among their
classmates by the time they take upper level courses63 and students cultivate
their in-class reputations through their actions in every exercise in a simulationbased course. Even though the individual may indeed be untrustworthy, the
public labeling of someone as untrustworthy can be problematic, particularly
so if the aberrant conduct was because of a simple error in judgment or
misunderstanding. Properly balancing the pedagogical concerns of discussing
allegations of unethical conduct with student welfare is critical.
The most important factor in achieving this balance is creating a positive
and healthy learning environment. In this kind of environment students and
the instructor have mutual respect for each other, which allows for discussions
of conflicting ideas and values, hard work, and constructive criticism.64 To
forge this atmosphere, instructors should know their students, value them
as individuals, have high expectations for them, and be concerned, caring,
encouraging, and helpful.65 Furthermore, if students respect and trust
58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Id. Two-thirds of the grade in Craver’s course is based on the outcome of in-class negotiation
exercises, and the grade for the exercise in question is dramatically impacted. Id. Faculty
who adopt this method will have to adjust the penalty to fit their respective courses.

61.

Craver, supra note 55, at 308.

62.

Id.

63.

Negotiation is an upper-level elective course at most law schools although there are noted
exceptions such as Harvard Law School.

64.

Stuckey, supra note 43, at 114.

65.

Id. at 114–18.

Teaching Negotiation Ethics

93

their instructors, having difficult conversations about potentially unethical
negotiation conduct becomes conducive to learning. With the goal of creating
a class-wide learning conversation, it may be instructive to reconceptualize the
goals of such a conversation using principles of restorative justice.
Restorative justice is forward-looking, concerned with meeting the needs
of victims and reforming offenders while restoring balance to the community
through dialogue.66 Thus, through the discussion the classroom community
can be involved in holding an offender accountable and responding to the
needs of the victimized student.67 In some cases, the accused may not have
violated the legal standard but may have violated a class norm, in which case
restorative principles still apply. In either case, the instructor should make part
of the conversation focus on reintegrating the purported offender back into
the classroom community.68 The first method of doing this is not treating the
potential violator with contempt, but with respect despite her potential fauxpas. Additionally, the subject of the discussion should be the conduct at issue
such as the specific language used, not whether the student is ethical. More
direct ways of facilitating the student’s reintegration in the class include:
• Discussing the number of times the issue has come up in prior classes;
• Expressing the instructor’s gratitude that this happened in the
learning environment of class rather than in the real world where the
consequences could be much more severe;
• Thanking the student for providing a learning opportunity by
recognizing that students including the accused are now much less likely
to make such a mistake;
• Referring to the results of studies of attorney negotiation conduct;
• Discussing how one regains trust from others once an action like this
occurs; and
• Discussing the issue of trust in future negotiation simulations.
Undoubtedly there are many other ways to reintegrate the student into the
class. The key here is that the instructor sets the tone of how this student
will be treated in the classroom going forward, and if the instructor sends the
message that this person is now an “outsider” in terms of the class community,
the students will treat the person accordingly the rest of the semester.
No matter whether an instructor decides to use the trial method or the open
discussion method, the potential for reputational injury is there. This danger
can be mitigated not only by creating the proper classroom environment, but
66.

Christopher Bennett, The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of Punishment 21–22
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); Mark S. Umbreit, Betty Voss, Robert B. Coates & Katherine
A. Brown, Facing Violence: The Path of Restorative Justice and Dialogue 8 (Criminal
Justice Project 2003).
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2001).
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also by covering the issue of negotiation ethics early in the semester, as opposed
to later, as is traditional.69 And after this class, an instructor can institute the
ethics trial or open discussion. At this point students should be clear about
Rule 4.1’s dictates and can be responsible for their negotiation conduct. An
interesting side benefit of this change is elevating ethics to a foundational issue
in the students’ eyes.
C. Reputational Index
A negotiator’s reputation is based on the memory of others’ negotiation
experience and their memory of the negotiation—the negotiator’s demonstrated
behavior, the negotiator’s treatment of them, and the fairness of the outcome
and the process.70 Without question, reputations are highly subjective, and
the actions that create them can be observed directly or reported from other
sources.71 Additionally, first impressions and early experiences carry immense
influence in reputation formation.72
Negotiators are wise to cultivate good reputations for credibility
and trustworthiness because one’s reputation is a critical factor in their
counterpart’s negotiation tactics. Negotiators tend to use more competitive
negotiation tactics with those who, through dishonest or overly competitive
behavior, have a negative reputation73 and are more forthcoming with those
who have good reputations.74 Thus, a “bad” reputation can undermine one’s
ability to be successful in negotiations and a “good” reputation can enhance a
negotiator’s ability to be successful.75 Furthermore, having a good experience
with another directly correlates to one’s desire to have future negotiations with
that person.76
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These results illustrate the close connection between reputation and trust
in negotiations. A basic level of trust in one’s counterpart is essential because
negotiators must trade information to determine if a deal is possible. If one
cannot trust the fundamental information being conveyed, that person will
be hesitant to disclose any non-obvious information, and a negotiated deal
becomes unlikely.77 And even when agreements are achieved, a lack of trust can
inhibit the creation of mutually efficient arrangements.
In order to make these lessons take—that reputation constitutes an
important component of the ethics, professionalism, and outcomes in
negotiation—students need to experience the influence of their reputations
first hand. One mechanism for doing so in negotiation courses is suggesting
that students speak with those with whom their negotiation counterparts have
already negotiated, in order to research the counterparts’ reputations. The
most effective way, however, is through the use of a Reputation Index, which
is sure to drive the point home.
The Reputation Index is a grading tool created by Roy Lewicki for use in
his MBA negotiation courses, which has successfully made the leap to law
school negotiation courses. In his syllabus, Lewicki describes the index as
follows:
The Index is a proxy for the long-term effects of reputations created by
negotiation activities in organizations, where the negotiations you conduct
today affect the perceptions and expectations of others tomorrow. The index
recognizes that those individuals who have reputations as trustworthy and
effective negotiators will have an advantage in future negotiations, and
those who have reputations as untrustworthy and ineffective will have a
disadvantage.78

Nancy Welsh, one of the first law school professors to adopt the Index, polls
her students at the end of the semester. She asks each student to identify up to six
classmates “you think have developed positive reputations as negotiators” and
suggests that “[n]egotiators earn positive reputations by displaying—or being
perceived as displaying—competence, effectiveness, trustworthiness, integrity
and so on.”79 She also asks each student to identify up to six classmates “you
think have developed negative reputations as negotiators” and suggests that
“[n]egotiators develop negative reputations as negotiators by displaying—or
being perceived as displaying—dishonesty, incompetence, ineffectiveness, lack
Culture and Procedural Fairness: When the Effects of What You Do Depends on How You
Do It, 45 Admin. Sci. Q. 138, 138 (2000).
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of trustworthiness, lack of integrity, and so on.”80 Besides simply identifying
students in response to the question, Welsh asks for specific examples, which
she conveys to the identified students for feedback purposes.81
The Index is a small percentage of a student’s final grade in both Lewicki’s (10
percent) and Welsh’s (5 percent) respective courses.82 Keeping the percentage
relatively small is important because there is always a worry that it could turn
into a “popularity contest” or a student could try to bribe others to report that
he has a good reputation.83 On a more substantive note, social science research
has found that a number of irrelevant factors (e.g., race, gender) influence
our assessments of others, including people’s general preference for those like
themselves.84 Despite the small percentage of the final grade that the Index
constitutes, the index signals the importance of reputation to students.
V. Conclusion
When teaching negotiation ethics the instructor’s primary goal should
be for students to learn the skills of identifying and resolving ethical
problems. The most effective method is to employ negotiation role-play
exercises followed by a discussion of the experience and various hypothetical
examples.85 Emphasis should be placed on areas where practicing lawyers are
particularly weak: identifying material facts in context, understanding the law
of misrepresentation, and applying Rule 4.1, especially in conjunction with
other competing ethical rules and values.86
But focusing on whether negotiation behavior is legal or illegal (that is,
ethical or unethical under the Rules) is not enough. The emphasis on rules,
laws and procedures causes students to come to believe that the law is the only
yardstick by which they need to measure themselves.87 Negotiators, however,
evaluate their counterparts’ actions and behaviors on interpersonal dimensions
based on values such as respect and fairness, regardless of the ethics rules.
Students need to understand that acceptable behavior under the Rules may
violate personal notions of fairness or respect, which can have consequences
for one’s reputation, not to mention a dramatic negative effect on subsequent
negotiations. Therefore, it can be useful and corrective to persuade students
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to accept that their behavior is the external manifestation of who they are, and
that adding an ethical dimension to their actions will ultimately influence their
reputation and self-image.88
One proven method to get the point across is to make one’s reputation
an integral part of the negotiation course—in grading criteria and/or in
class discussions. Focusing on whether certain behaviors are ethical, moral,
or effective in the long run should help establish an in-class norm of ethical
behavior, which can then be extrapolated into the world of legal practice in a
number of ways.
This discussion of teaching negotiation ethics brings a larger point about
legal negotiation to the fore. Lawyers rely on their beliefs about lawyering
and the lawyer’s role in the negotiation process to make both conscious and
unconscious strategic choices.89 One such notion is a belief that loyalty to
their clients is their “first and only” responsibility.90 Another is that lawyers are
comfortable with having only a cursory knowledge of the negotiation ethics
rules.91 When these beliefs are the norm, it’s no wonder that lawyers perform
poorly when asked to put their knowledge of negotiation ethics to task. In
fact, when asked whether they would agree with a client’s request to engage
in blatantly fraudulent negotiation conduct, only half of the attorneys in a
recent survey said they would refuse the request.92 Moving legal culture to a
place where such behavior is unquestionably unacceptable is critical to the
profession, and it begins with us, in the classroom, where we teach negotiation
ethics to the next generation of lawyers.
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